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Costs, risks and inefficiencies in Collaborative 
Networks (CNs) resulting from information 
asymmetries have been discussed in the scientific 
community for years. In this work, supply chain 
networks, as common representative of CNs, are used as 
object of investigation. Therein, problems and 
requirements of interorganizational information 
exchange are elaborated as well as the potential role 
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) could play to 
address them. As major challenge, convincing all 
relevant network partners to resolve asymmetric 
information by sharing sensitive data is identified. To 
face this issue, the value of shared information is 
prioritized as a motivational aspect. Finally, we 
propose a search process to systematically assess the 
benefits of information sharing in collaborative 
networks. To coordinate and implement this process 
regarding the derived requirements of CNs we propose 
system components based on DLT design patterns. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Various approaches are currently being discussed as 
to how Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), in 
particular Blockchain, could be used in business 
applications. Blockchain became famous for the 
enablement of immutable and secure transactions within 
a peer-to-peer network without the need for additional 
trusted intermediaries [1]. The advantages of improved 
data integrity, decentralization, disintermediation and 
thus reduced transaction costs are also seen as an 
advantage of DLT-based information system 
components in different kinds of applications [2]. In 
summary, profit is seen for the individual players in the 
network by having the opportunity to access data which 
otherwise would not be in their scope [2-5]. Particularly 
in the case of specific CNs like supply chains, it was 
found that information sharing and coordination helps 
to reduce the bullwhip effect and the supply chain costs 
[31, 32, 42]. Therefore, DLT could enable innovative 
business models as well as new quality of collaboration 
in business networks. Nevertheless, adoption of this 
technology is seen as a long lasting process over years 
[6]. With this work, we want to contribute to 
understanding and leveraging DLTs’ potential for the 
investigation and reduction of information asymmetry 




Different types of DLT have evolved so far [7]. While 
public distributed ledgers are accessible to anybody, 
permissioned distributed ledgers require authentication 
and authorization within a consortium network. An 
approach to construct modular permissioned 
architectures for Blockchains are so-called sidechains 
[7,8]. The architecture consists of a central consortium 
Blockchain and a set of private subnets. Access requests 
are managed via the consortium Blockchain. The 
subnets are used for local transactions to share 
information between groups of partners. Therein a local 
transaction only requires consensus between the nodes 
associated with the partners. With the sidechain 
approach, data can be hidden from other competitors 
and can only be exchanged with a trusted circle of 
partners. A sidechain can therefore provide more 
privacy within a consortium network for example in 
business applications [7]. Xu et. al. identifies and 
describes design patterns for Blockchain-based 
applications [2]. In this work, we use the following three 
of these patterns. The reverse oracle pattern is used to 
interact with the external world - it can be used from 
existing off-chain components to get on-chain data and 
verify if required conditions are met. As second pattern, 
we introduce encrypting on-chain data. It is classified as 
a data management pattern and used to hide sensitive 
on-chain data to specific participants with encryption. 
Also, tokenization is part of this class. It is used to 






represent transferable assets like currency. Solutions 
based on DLT may have different application fields. In 
our case, we try to apply it on coordination processes 
within collaborative networks. To get a common 
understanding of this term we use the definition of 
Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh [9]. They define 
collaborative networks as “constituted by a variety of 
entities (e.g. organizations and people) that are largely 
autonomous, geographically distributed, and 
heterogeneous in terms of their: operating environment, 
culture, social capital, and goals. Nevertheless these 
entities collaborate to better achieve common or 
compatible goals, and whose interactions are supported 
by computer network” [9]. 
 
3. Research Challenge and Question 
 
Supply chains are mentioned as common example for 
CNs in literature, which is why we have also selected 
them as the subject of our investigation [10, 11]. 
Therein, more transparency and reduction of 
asymmetric information is seen as needed, satisfiable 
through improved information exchange and 
coordination. So far, reasons why the operation of 
common systems to satisfy this need in CNs often fails 
are on different levels e.g. by economical, 
organizational and technical implications (see section 
5). Therefore, we first elaborate the existing problems 
regarding the lack of information exchange in such 
collaborative networks and derive the requirements for 
improved information exchange (see section 5.1). 
In recent years, Supply Chain Management (SCM) has 
also emerged as an interesting application field for DLT 
as its default state of truth is seen as an opportunity to 
improve interorganizational information exchange [2-
4]. Between most of the involved parties, there are 
various reasons for that e.g. to demonstrate 
sustainability of products, to coordinate product recalls 
or to reduce bullwhip effects. One can also observe the 
opportunity to expand the current optimization potential 
of processes from internal to interorganizational level 
with process management based on DLT [5]. That is 
why we assume that the reduction of information 
asymmetry can serve as the central feature and the pivot 
for the decision about the use of this technology as base 
of an interorganizational information system. To 
leverage the mentioned opportunities and keep the 
promises of a decentralized and distributed system, 
different stakeholders in CNs need to join a 
collaborative system. As voluntary information 
exchange between organizations need to be beneficial 
for all of them [12], the main question of this work is 
how the search process for a win-win situation can be 




For our research, we used the Design Science 
Research Methodology (DSRM). According to Peffers 
et al., the approach can be used to solve problems at the 
intersection of IT and organizations [13]. Due to this 
fact and the primary goal to develop a new artifact in the 
form of a coordination process for the reduction of 
information asymmetry in CNs, the approach of Peffer 
et al. is preferred to other existing DSRM approaches 
[14,15]. The DSRM consists of the following six 
process steps: (1) Problem identification and 
motivation, (2) Definition of objectives of solution, (3) 
Design and development of the solution artifact, (4) 
Demonstration of the solution artifact, (5) Evaluation of 
the effectiveness and efficiency, (6) Communication. A 
two-stage iteration through the steps of the DSRM is 
aimed. The first iteration consists of steps 1-3 and will 
be part of this paper (see section 5). During the second 
iteration, the presented approach should be adapted 
according to new insights and finally prototypically 
developed, demonstrated and evaluated (steps 3-6). The 
results of the second iteration will be presented in 
another paper. Our first step of the DSRM, is based on 
expert interviews and a literature review. The aim of this 
step is to identify current problems in SCM regarding 
information exchange and to motivate the research 
question. Within the second step of the DSRM, the 
objective of a solution is defined from derived 
requirements along with the challenges and existing 
approaches from literature trying to fulfill them. 
Afterwards the gained insights were used to design a 
process for solving the problem as part of step three. The 
implementation (3) and execution of the demonstration 
step (4) as well as the evaluation (5) and communication 
(6) steps are planned in the near future. This paper 
concludes with an outlook on this future steps based on 
the results of this work. In the following subsections, the 
procedure of the first iteration will be described in more 
detail. 
  
4.1 Expert Interviews 
 
The aim of the expert interviews is to provide a 
realistic coverage of current problems for 
interorganizational information exchange in SCM and 
today’s trend to address these issues using DLT, 
respectively Blockchains. In order to gain a broad 
insight into this topic, representatives of various 
companies and scientific institutions with 
correspondingly different backgrounds were selected 
and contacted. The spectrum ranges from founders of a 
Blockchain startup to representatives of an established 
enterprise software house, which provides Blockchain 
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solutions in enterprise software. All experts had 
experience with the realization of Blockchain projects, 
either from an advisory or technological point of view. 
The interviews were conducted over the phone and 
lasted between thirty minutes and one and a half hours. 
Semi-structured interviews were used, in which all 
desired topics can be covered with the help of pre-
formulated questions [16]. The interviews were 
conducted openly based on the guidelines of the 
questionnaire. First, general questions were asked about 
the person in order to be able to classify the background 
of the participants. This was followed by questions 
about the current state of supply chains, such as: Who 
are the different stakeholders within a supply chain? 
What information is currently exchanged between them 
and through which channels? Is there trust between 
them? What is the current IT infrastructure in companies 
for storing and transmitting data like and what are the 
problems? Subsequently, it was discussed how DLT can 
solve these problems and what advantages and 
disadvantages they have. Finally, the future of DLT 
solutions in general and in the context of the companies 
was discussed. A total of six expert interviews were 
carried out. The audio tracks of these interviews were 
recorded. Based on these records, a written protocol was 
prepared for further evaluations. With the help of 
additional literature in the context of Blockchain and 
DLT for interorganizational information exchange, 
problems were identified related to this topic in the 
SCM. Finally, the requirements could be derived from 
the previous findings.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
The literature review is used as part of DSRM step two 
to gather knowledge about feasible objectives and 
requirements for a solution which goes beyond the 
findings from the expert interviews in SCM. To identify 
publications related to the sharing and valuation of 
information in a collaborative network, we searched in 
the following scientific databases to ensure a 
comprehensive coverage of the subject: IEEE Xplore, 
ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect and EBSCOhost. 
The electronic databases were searched with the string 
"information AND value AND shar* AND collaborative 
network" in the title, abstract and keywords. We have 
explicitly excluded the search term "supply chain" to 
obtain a broader range of possible references in the 
context of different branches and use cases of CNs. That 
search returned a total of 400 results. In the first step, 
the authors filtered these results by analyzing the title, 
abstract and keywords regarding the problems identified 
in DSRM step one. Also 15 duplicates were sorted out 
here. If a minor relevance was identified, the 
publications were marked for a second, finer granular 
rating, where the full-texts were considered in detail. In 
total 70 publications were marked as relevant in the first 
step. The final collection of relevant articles included 15 
publications after the finer granular rating in the second 
filtration step. To prevent the exclusion of key papers, 
forth and back references are considered in a last step so 




Within this section, we apply the described 
methodology to tackle the research challenge. In order 
to derive requirements, we describe the results of the 
conducted expert interviews, followed by related 
approaches from literature and our resulting process 
proposal. Based on the expert interviews and the 
combined literature review, seven organizational, two 
economical and four technical problems were identified 
in the context of information exchange in supply chains 
(see Figure 1).  
  
5.1 Requirements from Expert Interviews 
 
Following, requirements are derived from problems 
identified by the expert interviews and considered in 
more detail by corresponding literature. Supply chains 
tend to be complex and consist of a large number of 
participants, which are often solely interested in the 
profit and success of their own business [17]. An 
efficient collaboration is therefore difficult, because 
sometimes no sense of community is available (O1). The 
reason for this is not always the lack of cooperation, but 
cultural obstacles (O2) arising from the different origins 
of the companies [18,19,20]. In order to solve these 
problems and overcome the obstacles, a rethinking of a 
cooperative mindset must take place [18,19]. A platform 
cannot do that. For this reason, the psychological barrier 
to participation in a common solution must be kept as 
low as possible (R1). 
Based on the experts’ statements, the supply chain is not 
only complex, but also intransparent. Companies often 
only know their direct contacts or a small number of 
their downstream and upstream contacts [17]. For 
example in the food industry, participating companies in 
a supply chain are only required to store information 
about the companies from which products have been 
received (“one-step-down”) and information about the 
companies to which the products have been delivered 
(“one-step-up”) [21]. Product recalls in the food 
industry are complicated and costly, because along the 
supply chain the cause of the defect must be determined 
systematically over the different connections [22]. Not 
only have the companies themselves lacked 
transparency, but also the consumer. The consumer 
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desire for information on qualitative characteristics e.g. 
in the food supply chain the need for proof of origin or 
bio-credentials is increasing and therefore also the need 
of a transparent solution [22].  A common solution must 
resolve the lack of transparency (O5) by satisfying both 
information providers and the information consumers 
with the degree of information (R6). 
Due to the large number of participants in a supply 
chain, the management and planning of collaborations 
are not easy and often led to coordination problems (O8) 
[23,24]. Currently, finding a provider for a specific job 
is costly and time-consuming because of the lack of 
transparency [17]. A common platform must keep the 
coordination effort low (R7). 
One of the main problems is the lack of trust (O4) 
[23,24,25]. A manager of an enterprise software house 
reports that when implementing a common Blockchain 
solution to optimize the food supply chain, the various 
stakeholders do not want to be identifiable because of 
the fear that they could be passed over and replaced by 
a new stakeholder. The trust that the information will 
not fall into the wrong hands is important for a 
cooperative solution, especially when sensitive 
information needs to be shared [23]. With the help of the 
expert interviews, the following types of information 
were identified as sensitive information, which 
companies are reluctant to share with other 
stakeholders: (1) identifying business partner data and 
supplier information; (2) order and billing information 
e.g. prices, quantities; (3) company secrets e.g. recipes. 
Accordingly, as a requirement for a common solution, it 
is inferred that participants should retain control over 
their information resources and that the degree of 
information exchange should be determinable (R2, R3). 
In addition to trusting the other participants, there must 
also be some trust in the technology [25]. Only in this 
way it can be ensured that participants do not withhold 
information, despite their own control over the degree 
of information exchange. Withholding information can 
reduce the effectiveness of a common solution for 
information exchange [23]. The trust in the technology 
is strengthened in particular by the aspects robustness, 
reliability and security [19]. Therefore the common 
solution should provide a secure and confidential 
channel for sharing information over a neutral 
decentralized platform (R4, R5). According to the 
experts, power structures often prevail (O3) in supply 
chains. These structures mean that stakeholders which 
are more powerful are compelling the other less 
powerful stakeholders to join their intended platform 
[26]. This approach is not conducive to building trust 
[27]. In a common solution in which such power 
relations do not predominate, the powerful participants 
are afraid that they will lose the control over the projects 
[28]. As a result, the psychological barrier for 
participation should be low (R1). No matter how 
technologically mature, secure and trustworthy a 
common solution may be, it is still useless if nobody 
participates in it. For this reason, an additional benefit 
must be recognizable for each participant. The problem 
here is that the additional value is not obvious for each 
participant (E1) in the supply chain, because there is not 
always a monetary advantage [18,19,26]. Why, for 
example, should a farmer take part in a common 
solution for information exchange and spend his time 
writing down information that might give others of the 
supply chain a monetary advantage? Especially, if he 
has to buy hardware for the information input and 
therefore even has monetarily disadvantages? “At this 
point, it is necessary to be persuasive, since these actors 
are nevertheless important information providers in the 
network” (developer of an enterprise software house). 
Even if the various stakeholders can be motivated to 
participate, there is the problem of having to clarify 
which stakeholders finance the common solution. Due 
to the lack of a cooperative mindset, according to the 
experts it is possible that this point will lead to 
disagreements over the financing (E2), because often 
the responsibility for paying costs is shifted between the 
companies [24]. For a common solution, this means that 
both the costs for the participation and the profits earned 
collectively through the information exchange must be 
fairly distributed so that everyone benefits and has an 
incentive to participate (R10). 
In addition to the aforementioned organizational 
problems, the implementation of a common technology 
also raises technical barriers, which need to be 
overcome. In recent years, companies have streamlined 
the exchange of information within the enterprises so 
that employees have access to consistent data through 
databases or cloud services [29]. A manager in the 
Blockchain section of an enterprise software house 
mentioned in the interview that beyond the 
organizational boundaries, there is no real-time 
exchange of information (T4). He describes the current 
process of interorganizational information exchange as 
follows: “You send an order via FAX/EDI/XML 
Document/RosettaNet/Web Service to your business 
partner and hope that someday he will answer. This has 
nothing to do with real time anymore. You may receive 
a confirmation in real time that the document has been 
received”. Accordingly, a common solution would 
require a platform that allows the real-time information 
sharing, so that everyone can work on the same data, not 
on erroneous and outdated data (R17). Another technical 
problem is that every company has different 
technological capabilities (T3) for the exchange of 
information [24]. Looking back at the farmer in the food 
supply chain, he will presumably have different 
hardware specifications or channels for information 
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exchange than a large retailer. According to the experts, 
the exchange of information is sometimes still offline 
using paper. For this reason, a common solution must be 
set up so that a small minimum technical requirement is 
needed for participation and digitization of the 
information (R16). Because of these different 
capabilities and lack of compatibility between the 
different systems, interoperability is also hard to 
achieve. The reasons for the lack of interoperability (T2) 
are usually missing standards [24,28]. In addition to the 
hardware standards, there are also missing standards for 
the exchange of information, which specify in which 
format information should be exchanged [23,28]. To 
improve interoperability, industry and data standards 
are needed [18]. Because of this, a standardized solution 
is preferred in a common platform for 
interorganizational information exchange (R14).  
Due to a lack of interoperability, producers, for 
example, tend to make their own platforms available for 
the exchange of information with the standards they 
have chosen. Suppliers are forced to use all different 
platforms and must adapt to each producer’s standards, 
which is costly and time-consuming [26, 30]. To ensure 
interoperability, a common solution should avoid a so-
called vendor lock-in (R15) [30].  
 
5.2 Approaches from Literature Review 
 
Most found publications deal with theoretical models to 
simulate CNs and the dynamics prevailing in such 
environments to capture the value of information 
sharing. Prominent examples for such models are the 
one proposed by Fiala et al. [31] and the model of 
Cachon et al. [32]. Fiala et al. models the flow of 
material, information and finance in a supply chain. 
Cachon et al. examines the added value of sharing 
inventory information in a supply chain and compares 
the costs obtained by this approach with the costs of 
systems that follow traditional policies. In their study, 
costs have been reduced by 2.2 % by sharing 
information. Both showed that information sharing can 
be useful in supply chains to reduce the bullwhip effect 
[31,32]. Chituc et al. [33] define performance metrics to 
measure the performance assessment of a CN. 
According to them, the decision whether to join, leave 
or remain in a CN depends on the three defined 
performance metrics: costs, payoff and agility. They 
also demonstrate analytical models to estimate them 
[33,34]. Based on their research, it can be deducted that 
an incentive to participate in a CN is the prior 
clarification of the join/leave/remain problem by 
contextualizing the three metrics. A possible solution 
should support the decision-making process by 
considering metrics as requirement (R11). In  Benqatla 
et al. [35] a similar approach is modeled with the help 
of the actor network theory in order to motivate actors 
to cooperate in CNs by calculating cost-savings related 
to the participation. This model together with the 
research of Susha et al. [12] supports the expert 
statements that a situation is needed where every 
participant benefits from a common solution (R10). 
Susha et al. notes that the fear of competitive advantage 
by other organizations could be an obstacle of extended 
information sharing. Pardo et al. [36] argues that 
between the members of a CN, trust, mutuality and a 
common identity should preveal. According to Fulford 
et al. [37] especially small enterprises cannot fully 
exploit the potential for collaboration, as they do not 
have the resources to build up systems to allow 
collaboration. To counteract this, the psychological and 
technical barriers for participation in a CN should be 
low (R1, R16). A further aspect that is mentioned by 
Woods et al. [38] and Freudiger et al. [39] is the 
consideration of the quality of the shared data. In order 
to prevent frustrations regarding different data qualities, 
Woods et al. propose a data mining method to structure 
the shared data (T1). Persistent repositories for the 
storage of shared data are proposed as relevant (R13). 
Freudiger et al. on the other hand, uses protocols so that 
an organization can test the data quality of shared data 
provided by a server prior to the purchasing of the data. 
In order to protect data privacy, only the value of the 
quality metrics are shared. Especially in the context of 
data monetization they see the ability to check the data 
quality prior as very useful (R12). In the context of 
information markets, Vishik et al. [40] see also 
recognizable currencies as more efficient than pure data 
exchange models, especially because of the challenge of 
reconciling different options and views on the value of 
information and the reduced search effort. According to 
them, these currencies do not necessarily have to be of 
monetary nature and can also be tokens. Fleisch et al. 
[11] mention that the classical supply chains are 
replaced by more complex, flexible and temporary CNs, 
which require more skills from the information manager 
(O7). In order to facilitate the coordination and sharing 
of information in such networks, we believe that a 
possible solution should support the decision-making of 
information managers (R9).  
Beside theoretical models, studies and reviews in the 
context of information sharing and coordination have 
been found. Durugbo [10] investigated in a case study 
to what extent CNs can be used for the management of 
integrated information flows and proposed a conceptual 
framework to manage the flow integration. They 
propose the need for CN managers to prevent vague 
collaborative agreements, generate procedurally 
prompts, make implementation checklists, strengthen 
the relationship and trust with partners, use systematic 
templates for communication, determine stern issuance 
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policies, as well as the separation of business and 
technological concerns over the collaboration time. For 
this purpose they also suggest to build up a decision 
support system for CN manager (R9). Günther et al. [41] 
has conducted a case study in the timber industry to 
examine how an implemented supply chain 
management system can support collaborative planning 
processes but could’t find noticeable improvements. In 
their opinion, this may be due to the fact that the users 
of the system have not been sufficiently trained to use it 
and have therefore lost their motivation. For this the 
psychological and technological barriers to participate 
should be low (R1,R16). In the study of Brown et al. 
[42], the technological and organizational challenges of 
sharing cyber security information are presented and 
requirements from the community are summarized for a 
possible solution. The key challenges they mentioned 
for building such systems are: working with multiple 
information sources, combining, determining and 
enriching data and the allocation of the information into 
organizational workflows and technological products 
(R14). No technological solutions to these problems are 
mentioned. 
Also existing technological implementations could be 
identified with the help of the literature review. 
According to Kadar et al. [43], negotiations are the basis 
for cooperation and coordination between actors. They 
use a multi-agent based negotiation system to maintain 
sustainable interoperability. The decentralized 
negotiation process that is mapped by the system 
represents contract negotiations between organizations 
where dissatisfaction with the current process leads to 
disruption of interoperability and thus to renegotiation. 
Based on their research, we believe that a decentralized 
negotiation or voting system can be useful for the 
coordination of information sharing in CNs as well (R8).  
The literature review also identified a publication in the 
field of DLT, namely that of Angrish et al. [44]. They 
use a decentralized approach to handle manufacturing 
information generated by machines and computing 
nodes of different organizations using Blockchain 
technology. The focus here is on the design of the 
computing nodes and the physical devices and the 
connection of these via the Blockchain. No possibility 
for the systematic coordination of the information is 
shown. But they also emphasize that organizations must 
find ways to collaborate and share information in an 
inherently untrusted network. A similar approach is 
used by Pouly et al. [45]. They present a method for the 
automatic collection of manufacturing information, 
which forwards them automatically to the ERP system 
of an organization. These ERP systems are in turn 
interconnected to a central data warehouse. 
Based on the described results, it can be concluded that 
the literature review did not identify a systematic 
approach for the coordination of the search process 
which fulfills the derived requirements from the expert 
interviews. Especially with the new capabilities of DLT, 
we propose to come a step closer to solving the problem. 
For this purpose the following process is inspired by the 
problems and requirements of the mentioned 
approaches from literature combined with the insights 
from the expert interviews. 
Figure 1: Identified problems and derived 
requirements [17-27] 
5.3 Proposed Process and System Components 
 
In the previous section, we identified the need and 
prerequisites to reduce information asymmetry in CNs. 
Therein, convincing all relevant network partners to 
resolve asymmetric information by sharing sensitive 
data is a challenge. To face this systematically, we 
model an abstract search process to coordinate the 
finding of a win-win situation as solution artifact 
following step three of the DSRM (see figure 2). Our 
proposed process consists of four phases as well as 
several tasks in a chronological order to record 
information needs, their dependencies and value. The 
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developed phases and mechanisms as well as how they 
could be implemented according to the requirements 
mentioned above (see section 5.1) are described below 
to put it up to discussion. 
We hypothesize that DLT as it is proposed for 
information sharing in literature could also act as an 
integrative force between organizations for such 
coordination processes. Alternatively an intermediary 
has to address the described challenge, which 
contradicts the requirements derived from our studies 
(R1, R5, R11, R15). That's why we propose a 
permissioned DLT-backed system design.  
According to our observations in the SCM, we identify 
application-specific optimization requests, as triggering 
events such as product recalls or reducing bullwhip 
effects. As prerequisite, the initiating partner who 
identified optimization potential should invite the other 
partners to join a coordination process for its request. 
These events cause a search for information that may be 
provided by other partners but is currently not available 
for various reasons (see section 5.1). Therefore it should 
state the reason and target for his request to give other 
partners in the network a hint of possibly needed 
information and an incentive to take part of his initiative 
(R1). To limit the process in duration and reach the 
optimization target in finite time, three dates have to be 
defined in chronological order (Date 1 < Date 2 < Date 
3) and communicated by the initiating partner as stop 
criterion for the first three phases of the process. Also a 
predefined number of iterations per phase is conceivable 
to give the chance to adapt during the process phases. 
How to choose feasible timeframes and numbers of 
iterations has to be determined heuristically. 
 
Phase 1: Estimate Costs & Identify Information Needs 
and their Value Proposition 
To keep coordination effort low, this phase could be 
done informally e.g. via email and manually managed 
tools by each partner (R7). As our investigation showed, 
in SCM generally a one-step-forward and one-step-
backward relationship exists between partners with a 
certain level of trust. Therefore, the initiating request 
event must be forwarded by the partners to the 
respective other participants along this chain of trust 
(R7) in the network until Date 1. In order to overcome 
this hurdle, the initiating partner might work with 
incentives like data offerings in advance (R1). Also data 
sets to gain an impression about data quality may 
increase willingness to participate (R12). As support for 
a common understanding and as a template for the 
identification of the relevant information artifacts 
(ontology of data source and its meta data like content, 
format, access point, etc. which has to be defined after 
further investigation), definitions of standardized 
industry-based communication protocols might be used 
(R2, R14, R17). In parallel, each partner should also 
estimate costs and value propositions in order to 
determine metrics for evaluating the potential 
participation in information sharing (R11). 
Figure 2: Derived abstract process model 
Phase 2: Measure Information Asymmetry 
As a next step, we consider how the interest in 
information in the network is distributed and to what 
extent these interests depend on each other is part of this 
phase whereby an agreement about needed information 
could be accomplished. This should make transparent 
which information is relevant in the network and how 
the respective partners evaluate its priority. 
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From a processual point of view, the information 
artifacts identified in Phase 1 must first be completely 
weighted by the respective partners until Date 2. 
Prioritization can be specified by using simple scoring 
mechanisms. For example, every participant has 100 
points and can thus add and evaluate the information 
artifacts of interest over the predefined number of 
iterations until Date 2. Due to the desired level of 
transparency, scoring can also be blind during the voting 
phase as not to be influenced by each other but 
subsequently disclosed. As results of this voting phase, 
preference relations about the information artifacts 
within the network, the importance of single partners in 
this setting and strength of relationships between them 
can be determined. Therefore, the initiating partner has 
to make sure that partners who are willing to join are 
able to participate in Phase 2. Also, declining partners 
should be remembered because they could be important 
for compensation evaluation in Phase 4.  
From a technological point of view, we propose a voting 
system, that can be operated independently of a trusted 
instance regarding the derived requirements due to a 
missing sense of community as well as lack of trust and 
transparency (R1, R4, R5). We propose a DLT-based 
voting system (R8) to share the operation expenses (R6, 
R10) for specifying and prioritizing the required 
information artifact. Voting can be performed using 
transactions of tokens in a distributed ledger as proposed 
in literature [2,46]. Additionally blind voting could be 
possible, where scores can be submitted pseudonymous 
and encrypt on-chain data [2] until specified Date 2. 
 
Phase 3: Estimate Information Value 
After relevant information artifacts are identified in 
Phase 2, a mechanism is needed to help the partners 
assessing the potential value of their data for decision-
making about information sharing collaborations (R9). 
A market-oriented approach is proposed to approximate 
the values. The valuation of information is a field of 
research for years and is exposed to many challenges 
[47]. The trading of data and the development of data 
marketplaces are also associated with numerous open 
questions that have already been discussed in research 
[48]. We do not claim to solve the challenges in the 
research fields described above. Our approach is based 
on the assumption that a market-driven approximation 
of information value can be controlled by the demand of 
the partners. This demand is subject to an idea of 
optimization, from which the partners expect a benefit, 
which we will try to quantify here as a contribution to 
the base for decision-making. 
In this phase, we also consider a DLT-based information 
system component to be advantageous for the 
implementation of an auction mechanism (R8). Here, we 
propose hashing the information requests consisting of 
e.g. price and information artifact as well as writing it as 
time-stamped transaction into a ledger before 
submitting it. This helps to coordinate requests and 
make them verifiable afterwards. The DLT component 
would then be used according to the reverse oracle 
pattern for Proof of Existence [2]. The requests can 
afterwards be disclosed to the respective addressee (R5), 
who could accept one of the offers (probably the 
highest) for itself or make a counter-offer to the 
requestor using the same logic. Under the assumption 
that the price only turns out after an iterative 
approximation, this evaluation process can be carried 
out over several rounds up to predefined Date 3, 
whereby a suitable information value can be determined 
for our basic idea. 
 
Phase 4: Consensus 
Finally, each partner can compare the value of its 
information artifacts with the effort it would take to 
participate in a collaborative system. An agreement 
could be accepted if the previously estimated costs of 
participation in the network per partner is less than the 
value of salable information and estimated value 
proposition of needed information. If no agreement can 
be found between individual partners or the network 
depends on declining partners from earlier phases, 
compensation mechanisms should also be discussed 
based on the dependency relationships established in 
Phase 2 (R2). A DLT-based system that can achieve  
compensation between partners via tokenization pattern 
[2] in the form of a cryptocurrency could also be suitable 
for this purpose. Herein, there are also further 
challenges to discuss, in particular the danger of fraud, 
which is why this step must be considered with separate 
research efforts in the future (R3). The prospect of a 
win-win situation could outweigh the fear of fraud and 
can serve as motivation for a functioning compensation 
mechanism. 
 
6. Results & Limitations  
 
In this work, we analyzed problems and requirements 
regarding interorganizational information exchange in 
CNs to understand the potential role DLT could play. 
By conducting semi-structured expert interviews and 
literature review, we derived the need to systematically 
investigate information asymmetry in CNs. Combined 
with insights from an extensive literature review, we 
developed a search process for a win-win situation 
which is aimed to identify the degree of information 
asymmetry and potential value of information 
exchange. Using existing DLT design patterns, we 
propose system components to coordinate this process 
without additional intermediaries [2]. Our approach is 
intended to overcome limited trust between partners and 
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support the decision whether to establish a more data 
intense collaboration or not.  
Due to the small number of participants in the expert 
interviews, we would like to emphasize that our 
investigations are not free of methodological limitations. 
Currently, there is only a small number of experts which 
implement Blockchain or related DLT solutions in SCM 
and are willing to talk about their experiences. Due to this 
fact, technology providers, consultants, entrepreneurs 
and researchers have been interviewed. These have 
mostly a positive attitude towards DLT due to their 
proximity to the technology and its value proposition. We 
have tried to compensate for these limitations by 
reviewing the literature to substantiate the derived 
requirements. We conducted our literature reviews to the 
best of our knowledge, but also see these processes as 
error-prone due to the choice of search terms, strategy 
and scientific databases. In addition, the derived process 
has limitations inherent. As discussed, the pricing of 
information and trading of data as well as several dangers 
of fraud, attacks and competitive analyses are separate 
research fields and must be considered with effort in the 
future to make this process practically useful.  
 
7. Future Work  
 
As a next step, we will take our second iteration of the 
DSRM. Therefore, the presented approach will be 
adapted according to new insights and game theoretic 
considerations. Finally, the system components can be 
prototypically implemented and evaluated with real 
world scenarios. To this end, information artifacts have 
to be modelled. Our goal is to build an open source tool 
(R15, R16), which is easy to use, also for information 
managers in small businesses e.g. by being compatible 
with Blockchain as a Service (BaaS) provisioning. 
Furthermore, we can imagine the adoption in other areas 
than SCM, e.g. healthcare seems to be promising with 
similar problems. Additionally, upstream and 
downstream processes, which could be linked with the 
presented process, as well as the mentioned limitations, 
have to be further investigated and reduced in future.  
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